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DISCRETIONARY RELIEF FROM CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN MISSOURI
PART TWO
EARL T. CRAWFORD *
III. FORM AND EM CT OF RELIEF
Form of Document or Order
There is no requirement in the statutes or in the constitution
fixing the form of the parole or commutation document or order.
Since a pardon is in derogation of the law, in order to be valid
and effective, the instrument granting it must accurately de-
scribe the offense intended to be forgiven.98 Unless care is given
to the language used in the pardon or parole order, it may not
operate as intended. It does not matter that the paper signed
by the governor is called a pardon, if it does not purport to be
a pardon of the offense but only a release and discharge of the
convict from the penitentiary entitling him to all the rights,
privileges, and immunities which by law attach and result there-
from. 9 While the governor may grant a pardon on conditions,
such conditions to be operative must appear on the face of the
paper.100
When a parole is granted by the court, the same requirements
* Member of Missouri State Board of Probation and Parole; member of
the Missouri and Kansas bars; LL.B., Washington Univ., 1928; LL.M.,
Northwestern Univ., 1935. Part one of this article appears at 28 WAsH-
INGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY 1.
98. Ex parte Higgins (1884) 14 Mo. App. 601 (Memo. opinion).
99. See State v. Kirschner (1886) 23 Mo. App. 349. The material por-
tion of the document involved provided: "Know ye that, by virtue of the
authority in me vested by law, and for good and sufficient reasons appear-
ing, I, Silas Woodson, Governor of the State of Missouri, do hereby release,
discharge and forever set free James Wilkerson, who was, at the November
term, A. D. eighteen hundred and seventy-two, by a judgment of the Cir-
cuit Court of Cole County, sentenced to imprisonment in the state peni-
tentiary for the term of two years, for the crime of grand larceny, and
I do hereby entitle the said James Wilkerson, to all the rights, privileges
and immunities which by law attach and result from the operation of
these presents. Conditioned, that the said James Wilkerson immediately
upon his release, leave the County of Cole, and never return thereto volun-
tarily." Also note the separate opinion in State v. Saunders (1921) 288
Mo. 640, 232 S. W. 973, that the document was neither a pardon nor a
parole; and as a suspension of the judgment of the court, it could not be
sustained since it would be a matter beyond the power of the executive.
100. Ex parte Reno (1877) 66 Mo. 266.
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must be met in order that a parole may really be granted. In
several instances, the action of the court has fallen short of a
parole. Such was the case where a judgment was rendered, sen-
tencing the defendant to pay the costs, and to imprisonment in
the jail for a specified period of time, and the court granted a
stay of execution on the condition that defendant would move
from the place she then occupied and not return thereto nor again
violate the law. This was held not to constitute the granting
of a parole, since it failed to recite the essential requirements
of the law regulating the granting of such relief. °1 A similar
situation arose where the court incorporated in the usual judg-
ment sentencing the defendant, the provision that execution was
stayed until six o'clock of the afternoon, and that if he was there-
after found in the county, he was to be arrested and committed
to the penitentiary in accord with the sentence theretofore
passed. The defendant having violated this condition and having
been committed to the penitentiary, sought a writ of habeas
corpus, which was opposed by the state on the ground that the
stay was in the nature of a parole and that the petitioner having
violated it, was not entitled to be discharged. The court held
that the modification made by the trial judge of the otherwise
formal judgment of conviction, bore no resemblance to a parole
and could not be sustained, although the legality of the rest of
the sentence was not affected thereby. - 2 In another case the
court, after the defendant had been confined in jail for ninety
days, made an order releasing him from custody and suspending
further punishment pending good behavior. The supreme court
stated that this order had no validity as a parole, even though it
was intended by the judge as a commutation of punishment.
Even if it had been a valid parole, the court said, it had been
revoked by the subsequent order re-arresting and imprisoning
the defendant. Further, since the parole failed to require the
defendant to execute a bond and to appear in court to make
proof of his good behavior, it was void. The real basis for the
101. Ex parte Cornwall (1909) 223 Mo. 259, 122 S. W. 666.
102. "The recognition of the power of a court to suspend a sentence
indefinitely or to stay its execution would be to allow the judicial department
to usurp the power and exercise one of the functions of the executive
department. This is upon the well grounded theory that a court's power
in the administration of the criminal law, is limited, upon conviction of
the accused, to the imposition of the sentence authorized to be imposed."
Ex parte Thornberry (1923) 300 Mo. 661, 254 S. W. 1087.
19431
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss2/1
76 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 28
decision, however, was that the statute nowhere granted to a
judge in vacation the power to commute a punishment already
assessed and entered of record by the court in term time. 08
When Effective Acceptance
Inasmuch as a pardon, parole, or commutation are all mere
matters of grace, neither benefit nor right can be claimed under
them until the act of clemency is fully performed. The simple
intention of the executive to bestow a pardon confers no right,
and is wholly nugatory until the intention is fully completed.
This intention may be said to be fully completed when the par-
don is signed by the executive, properly attested, authenticated
by the seal of the state, and delivered, either to the person who is
the subject of the favor, or to some one acting on his behalf.
Whenever these things are done, the grantee, or donee of the
favor, becomes entitled as a matter of right to all the benefits
and immunities it confers, and he cannot be deprived of them
by a recall. 04 So a delivery sufficient to make the pardon effec-
tive took place when the governor got the usual pardon form
from the office of the Secretary of State, filled it in, handed the
paper to one of the parties waiting in the ante-room, instructed
him that it must be inscribed on the prison records and expressed
the opinion that it should be done by twelve o'clock, as, after
that time, his term as governor would cease. Such paper was
then delivered to the warden in the morning of the day issued
and entered on the prison records in the afternoon of the same
day.15 Said the court: "A delivery of the pardon, under the
circumstances in proof, is prima facie, equivalent to delivery, or
is constructive delivery to the prisoner." In this same case, the
court further held that the power of the governor to grant par-
dons and commutations is in nowise dependent upon any entry
which the law requires the Secretary of State to make, nor upon
any entry required to be made by the warden, since the former
requirement may be regarded as intended to preserve the evi-
dence of the official acts of the governor, and the latter as de-
signed to protect the warden in discharging a person who is the
recipient of executive clemency.06 The failure of the governor
103. Workmann v. Turner (Mo. App. 1926) 283 S. W. 61.
104. Ex parte Reno (1877) 66 Mo. 266.
105. Ibid.
106. "The omission of the Secretary to make an entry of the official act
of the Governor, in granting a pardon, would not have the effect to make
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to report the fact of a pardon, the name of the convict, etc., as
required by the constitution, to the General Assembly, would not
authorize the convict's re-imprisonment.10  Since pardons,
paroles, and commutations are purely matters of grace or favor,
the intended beneficiary may either reject or accept the proffered
favor when it is based upon condition. He has an unfettered
election in that regard, and the executive order is not effective
or operative until it has been accepted by him.0 8 If he prefers
serving the sentence originally imposed upon him to a suspension
of it under the conditions attached, the prisoner has a clear right
to do so; but if he elects to accept the commutation and avails
himself of the liberty it confers, he must do so upon the condi-
tions upon which it was granted to him. Having accepted the
parole, he cannot later object to the conditions imposed. Such
was the court's holding where the defendant accepted a bench
parole with a provision, which authorized the court to revoke it
without notice to him. This decision goes so far as to hold that
the defendant could not claim that the statute giving the court
the right to parole was invalid as to the court's power to revoke
without notice. The defendant could not apply for and accept the
benefits of the statute and then insist that the same statute was
invalid when the court asserted its right to revoke the parole. 0 9
In most cases, where an appeal is taken by the defendant, and,
pending the appeal, a pardon is granted to and accepted by the
defendant, he thereby will waive all his rights of appeal and
when the matter is brought to the attention of the appellate court,
void the pardon, any more than an entry, made by him in his register that
the governor had granted a pardon, would impart validity to it, when, in
fact, no such pardon had ever been granted. Besides, the prisoner had no
authority or control over the Secretary of State in regard to the perform-
ance of his duties." Ex parte Reno (1877) 6a Mo. 266, 272.
107. Ex parte Reno (1877) 66 Mo. 266.
108. Ex parte Strauss (Mo. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 1000.
109. "Defendant's reasoning is unsound. He proceeds on the theory that
some natural and legal right of his is being denied him, whereas the parole
for which he applied and which was granted him was purely an act of
grace on the part of the state through the court. Defendant had been law-
fully convicted and sentenced. He then had the option to serve his sentence
or apply for a parole under the laws of this state. He knew the provision
of that law and applied for and accepted his parole subject to its provisions
and conditions, among which was that which authorized the court to revoke
the parole without further notice to him. It was upon this condition he was
paroled. If this was invalid the parole was ineffective, and the judgment
was in full force. By accepting its terms he is now precluded from assail-
ing its validity." State v. Collins (1910) 225 Mo. 633, 125 S. W. 465.
1943]
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it will dismiss the appeal. This is so because the very essence
of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of a penalty; it implies
guilt and affirms the verdict. But an appeal will not be dis-
missed by the court where the pardon recites that it was granted
upon the recommendation of the board of probation and parole
and because the governor was convinced that the accused was not
guilty, since the accused is entitled to remove the stigma of the
conviction, especially in view of the habitual criminal statute
which applies to subsequent offenders who shall have been previ-
ously discharged either upon pardon or upon compliance with the
sentence.10
Effect on the Sentence and Judgment
While the cases generally are in conflict as to the effect of a
pardon upon the sentence of the court,""' very little litigation
seems to have arisen thus far in Missouri concerning not only
the effect of a pardon but also that of a parole or commutation
on the sentence. It may be said, however, that a parole does not
displace or abridge the sentence, but merely stops its execution
either temporarily or indefinitely, as the case may prove to be.
It suspends rather than destroys."" So, where the governor at-
tached to a parole the condition that if the parolee failed to meet
its conditions, "he may be arrested and returned to the peni-
tentiary there to serve out the remainder of his sentence," the
court rightfully concluded that the full unexpired sentence at the
time the parole was granted continued until the end of the parole
period, so that, in case of a violation, he would have to serve
the full unexpired sentence measured from the effective date of
the parole." 3 But it has been held that a pardon, which of course
110. State v. Jacobson (Mo. 1941) 152 S. W. (2d) 101.
111. Some decisions hold that the governor's pardon does not wipe out
the offense, nor the fact of a prior conviction; others hold that an uncon-
ditional pardon wipes out and obliterates the offense and absolves the con-
vict of all guilt. And note the relatively recent case that on the issue
whether the acceptance of a pardon amounts to a waiver of the accused's
rights on appeal, a distinction may be drawn between the ordinary pardon
which implies guilt and acceptance a confession thereof, and one where is
affirmatively appears to have been granted because the governor was satis-
fied of the innocence of the accused. State v. Jacobson (Mo. 1941) 152
S. W. (2d) 1061.
112. State v. Collins (1910) 225 Mo. 633, 125 S. W. 465.
113. Jacobs v. Crawford (1925) 308 Mo. 302, 272 S. W. 931. For general
annotation on parole as suspending the running of sentence, see 28 A. L. R.
947. And for effect of the Missouri three-fourths law on the time to be
served, see note 172, et seq., supra. That the time a person is underjudicial parole shall not be counted on his sentence, in case of termination
of his parole, see R. S. Mo. 1939 §4200.
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is unconditional, terminates the convict's term in the prison, so
that he may be a competent witness within the scope of the
statute relating to the competency of witnesses in the peniten-
tiary. 14
There is also a conflict in the authorities, generally, whether
a pardon will release the defendant from the payment of a fine
as well as from the punishment imposed by the sentence.115 The
courts of Missouri do not seem to have had occasion to pass on
this question. Perhaps the reason rests largely in the remedy
provided by a specific statute,116 which prescribes that for any
fine imposed by any statute, and for any forfeiture of a recog-
nizance, where the securities are made liable, the governor has
power to grant a remittitur, when it appears to him that such
fine or forfeiture does an injustice or inflicts great hardship upon
the defendant or defendants.117
Another factor sometimes involved in cases of pardon is the
element of court costs. For instance, in an early case, where the
governor granted a pardon releasing the defendant from the pay-
ment of the fines and costs assessed in the case, except the fine
assessed against him and his pro rata share of the costs, the
court stated that "it is evident that, after a judgment for costs,
they cannot be remitted by pardon. Costs for which judgment
has been given, are not remitted by a pardon of the offense,
subsequent to the judgment, because there was an interest vested
in private persons." 1.8
The effect of a commutation on the sentence of the court is
obvious, since a commutation is a change of the punishment to
which a person has been condemned by the court to one less
severe. The following language in an apt decision is enlighten-
ing in this regard:
His (the governor's) power of commutation, however, act-
114. State v. Kelleher (1909) 224 Mo. 145, 123 S. W. 551.
115. See Annotation, 74 A. L. R. 118.
116. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4189.
117. This statute, however, provides a method for obtaining the relief
above set forth: "All applications for such relief shall be in writing, signed
by the party or parties seeking such remitter, and accompanied by a state-
ment of the facts of the case, signed by the judge or circuit attorney of
the county in which such fine or forfeiture is entered, and a certificate of
the clerk that all costs have been paid; and the governor shall indorse
his decision on each case and file the same in the office of the secretary of
state."
118. State v. McO'Blenis (1855) 21 Mo. 272, 276. Also see State v.
Jacobson (Mo. 1941) 152 S. W. (2d) 1061.
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ing on the original sentence of the court, cuts down and
modifies that sentence; and the force of that sentence, thus
modified, sends the prisoner to the penitentiary. The com-
mutation does not annul the sentence of the court, but is,
pro tanto, an affirmance of it, with modification. 19
As a result, even though a defendant is originally sentenced to
death and that sentence later commuted to life imprisonment, he
is confined in the penitentiary by virtue of the sentence of the
court. It is the force of the sentence that places him there and
not the power of the governor.
In case of a conditional commutation, the sentence of the court
is lessened conditionally. If the conditions of the commutation
are not met, the sentence as originally imposed must be served,
and only when the conditions are fully complied with, does the
commutation reduce the sentence.
Effect on Other CriminaZ Offenses
The pardon of one specific crime does not free the beneficiary
of the governor's act of clemency from the penal consequences
of all other crimes he has committed up to the date of the par-
don. 1 °0 Similarly, the fact that the accused has been pardoned
for a prior conviction, does not exempt him from the increased
punishment prescribed by the habitual criminal act, 12 as is
clearly apparent from the language used in the Missouri act that
a defendant cannot be brought within its purview unless he
"shall be discharged, either upon pardon or upon compliance
with the sentence."'' 2 And the word "pardon" as used in this
statute includes "parole," so that the use of the latter word in
an information filed against the defendant, rather than the word
"pardon" did not render the information defective.-3
119. Ex parte Collins (1887) 94 Mo. 22, 6 S. W. 345. And from the
same case note this language: "This is easily proven: A man is convicted
by the verdict of a jury, or upon his own confession in open court, and
his punishment assessed, either by the verdict or by the court, at ten years
in the penitentiary, and he is sentenced accordingly. That sentence is there-
upon commuted by the governor to the period of five years. Afterwards,
a question of the competency of the convict to testify as a witness comes
up. By what test would that competency be tried, but by the record of the
lower court?" Ex parte Collins (1887) 94 Mo. 22, 6 S. W. 345, 346.
120. State v. Creech (1876) 1 Mo. App. 370.
121. For general treatment of this, see Annotations, 58 A. L. R. 49;
82 A. L. R. 362; 116 A. L. R. 224.
122. State v. Austin (1893) 113 Mo. 538, 21 S. W. 31, State v. Christup(1935) 337 Mo. 776, 85 S. W. (2d) 1024.
123. State v. Asher (Mo. 1922) 246 S. W. 911. Also see State v. Jen-
nings (1919) 278 Mo. 544, 213 S. W. 421, where the defendant received
a bench parole, and at the date of the present trial was at liberty under
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Restoration of Civil Rights
Upon conviction for most offenses, the defendant by virtue of
the Constitution of the state, 4 or because of statute,12 5 suffers
the loss of certain civil rights, such as the right to vote, to hold
office, and to serve as a juror. A general statute provides that
a sentence in the penitentiary for a term less than life suspends
all civil rights of the person so sentenced, during the term there-
of, and that after a sentence to life imprisonment, the defendant
is civilly dead.28 Where civil death occurs, his property can be
administered upon in the probate court, and a release from prison
by parole or commutation would not entitle him to contract or
to own property. In fact, the parole of any convict seems hardly
sufficient of itself to remove the temporary suspension of his
civil rights until the full or commuted term of his sentence has
expired. Where the civil right is lost because of the constitutional
provision, such right surely can be restored only by the action
of the governor.
There are several statutory provisions relating to the restora-
tion of civil rights. The disabilities against voting, being a
juror, or holding any office of honor, profit, or trust in this state
may be removed by the governor through the exercise of the
pardoning power vested in him.27 Where the convict has been
such parole, he was not in legal contemplation in custody different from
that of the Circuit Court; but was by force of the parole statute in the
legal custody of and under the jurisdiction of said court, and such custody
was not a ground to postpone trial temporarily under the doctrine that
the court is without jurisdiction to proceed with the trial of a defendant
for another offense until the first judgment has been satisfied or reversed.
124. Mo. Const. 1875, Art. VII, §2. "No person .... while confined
in any public prison shall be entitled to vote, and persons convicted of
felony, or crime connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage may
be excluded by law from the right of voting."
125. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4601, (offenses relating to records, currency, in-
struments, and securities) ; R. S. Mo. 1939 §4357, (fraud by election judges
and clerks); R. S. Mo. 1939 §4322, (perjury and subornation thereof);
R. S. Mo. 1939 §4341, (fraud in office); R. S. Mo. 1939 §4427, (murder;
manslaughter; carnal knowledge of female between 16 and 18 years; carnal
knowledge of a woman above 14 years; forcing woman to marry; taking
away female under 18 years; enticing female to house of ill-fame; seduc-
tion; defiling ward by guardian; mayhem; assault with intent to kill;
poisoning); R. S. Mo. 1939 §4561, (arson, burglary, robbery or larceny in
any degree, or if sentenced to the penitentiary 'for any other crime in this
article relating to public and private property, except to persons under
age of 20 years at conviction'); R. S. Mo. 1939 §4796, (miscellaneous of-
fenses).
126. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9225.
127. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9227.
19431
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convicted of arson, burglary, robbery, or larceny, in any degree,
or has been sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for
any other crime in the article of the statutes relating to offenses
against public and private property, the disqualifications or dis-
abilities "may be removed by the pardon of the governor any
time after one year from the date of conviction."' ' 8 However,
such a statute cannot limit the power of the governor to restore
civil rights by virtue of the pardoning power granted him by
the state constitution. 2 9
Question may be raised as to the constitutionality of the statute
providing that any convict who serves three-fourths of his sen-
tence in an orderly and peaceable manner, "shall be discharged
in the same manner" as if he had served the full time for which
he was sentenced, and requiring no pardon from the governor.130
In all cases of first conviction of felony the civil disabilities in-
curred thereby cease at the end of two years from such dis-
charge under the three-fourths rule, and such convict thereupon
is restored to all the rights of citizenship.-' If the loss of civil
rights is a part of the sentence or judgment, as it seems to be,
the statute operates as an unlawful exercise of the executive
power by the legislature.1 32 If such loss occurs by virtue of the
128. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4561. But a conviction in another state does not
disqualify. See State v. Landrum (1908) 127 Mo. App. 653, 106 S. W. 1111.
129. Mo. Const. 1875, Art. V, §8.
130. See State v. Austin (1893) 113 Mo. 538, 21 S. W. 31, and State
v. Stanton (Mo. 1934) 68 S. W. (2d) 811, for apparent approval of the
provision.
131. R. S. 1939 §9086. And note Ex parte Schatz (1925) 307 Mo. 67,
269 S. W. 383, that where a statute places no restrictions on the word
'discharged' it has the meaning of being restored to freedom. It may not
mean that the convict has been given the right of suffrage, or the right
to hold office, but it does mean that in all other respects he is a citizen.
And 'discharge' is not the same as 'he has complied with said sentence',
in an indictment under the habitual criminal act. State v. Austin (1893)
113 Mo. 538, 21 S. W. 31.
132. State v. Grant (1883) 79 Mo. 113; "If the conclusion be the correct
one that the disabilities annexed to a conviction of the crime of petit
larceny form a part of the punishment, and of consequence part of thejudgment, then it would seem to follow as an obvious and necessary se-
quence that any act of the legislature professedly remitting a portion of
the judgment, professedly relieving the convict of one of the disabilities
incurred, cannot prevail, if the constitution, which forbids one department
of the government from the exercise of any power properly belonging to
either of the other, is to be obeyed .... the pardoning power is vested
by our constitution alone in the governor; that aside from the reversal
of the judgment in a criminal cause, the only method of relief from the
disabilities .... is by a full pardon of the offense, and that, while the
crime itself remains unpardoned, the disabilities annexed thereto will re-
main unaltered and unaffected by any legislative act."
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constitution, such rights would be beyond the power of the legis-
lature to restore by legislative enactment, unless perhaps the
three-fourths law can, also, be regarded as a part of the judg-
ment of conviction.
It is provided that any person discharged under the provisions
of those sections relating to judicial paroles, is to be restored to
all the rights and privileges of citizenship but whether the resto-
ration is automatic does not clearly appear, and if not, by what
authority, is not apparent.1 . 3 As a matter of legal principle, the
restoration would probably have to be by the governor.
The loss of civil rights is commonly referred to as the loss of
citizenship. A person, however, does not lose all civil rights
upon conviction for a crime. He may lose the right to vote, to
hold office, to be a juror, to own or to sell property, but some
rights are unaffected. For instance, if the convict commits a
new crime, he is entitled to a jury trial and all the rights con-
nected therewith. After a final discharge from the penitentiary,
he can live wherever he pleases and go wherever he may desire
to live. 34 Some civil rights are, therefore, obviously of such a
nature that they are not suspended by a criminal conviction.
A convict cannot execute a valid mortgage, 3 5 nor can a valid
decree be obtained, in a divorce action by a wife against him
while in prison, investing her with the title to his real estate,
unless he is represented in court by a trustee,3 6 appointed in
accord with the statute relating to the property of inmates of
the penitentiary.137 These same questions of legality arise in
event the convict is on parole. In this connection, however, where
a defendant was never taken into custody nor confined a day in
the penitentiary but was permitted to remain at large at all
times under a parole until he was finally discharged and par-
doned, a tax suit against him while he was under no actual re-
straint as to his liberty and had full opportunity to appear in
court and defend, could legally terminate in a valid judgment,
without the appointment of a trustee. This result was reached
because the statute provides that a trustee may be appointed only
"upon producing a copy of the sentence, duly certified, and satis-
133. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4210.
134. Ex parte Schatz (1925) 307 Mo. 67, 269 S. W. 383.
135. Williams v. Shackelford (1888) 97 Mo. 322, 11 S. W. 222.
136. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin (1910) 228 Mo. 635, 129 S. W. 21.
137. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9230.
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factory evidence that such convict is actually imprisoned under
such sentence."'23 Nor was the appointment of a trustee neces-
sary where the plaintiff was sentenced to imprisonment in the
penitentiary for less than life, but was on parole at the time of
trial, even though the suit was brought in his own name while
in prison.19 Also, a deed to real estate executed by a person con-
victed of a felony while he is on parole, is valid.14 0
The Power to Revoke
The actual power of revocation rests in the governor, 14  or
other granting authority, as the case may be.' 42 In the absence
of any constitutional or statutory provision and in the absence
from the pardon, parole, or commutation of express stipulations
authorizing the governor to inquire into and pass upon the ques-
tion of a violation of the terms of the extended executive clem-
ency, or to order the re-arrest of the convict, and subject him
to the execution of the original sentence imposed, the governor
,cannot legally revoke the pardon, parole, or commutation.143
Where the conditional pardon or commutation expressly pro-
vides that upon a violation of its conditions, the offender shall
be liable to summary arrest and recommitment for the unex-
pired portion of his original term, such provision is binding and
authorizes the convict's re-arrest and recommitment upon non-
performance of the conditions in the manner and by or through
the official authority therein provided.144
On the other hand, when a conditional pardon or a parole is
issued which does not provide how it shall be determined whether
the prisoner has violated the conditions imposed, then the con-
vict is entitled to a hearing before some competent judicial tri-
bunal before he can be remanded to serve the remainder of his
138. "Even though it be argued that Section 2291 suspended all civil
rights of plaintiff, and that therefore, while under sentence, he could not
execute a valid conveyance, and judgment could not be rendered against
him, nevertheless, we maintain the view that the parole operated to hold
in abeyance the legal consequences contemplated by said section, at least
in so far as the validity of transactions affecting plaintiff's property is
concerned." Ward v. Morton (1922) 294 Mo. 409, 418, 242 S. W. 966.
139. Cole v. American Ry. Express Co. (1934) 228 Mo. App. 78, 68
S. W. (2d) 736.
140. Ward v. Morton (1922) 294 Mo. 409, 242 S. W. 966.
141. Ex parte Strauss (Mo. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 1000.
142. See R. S. Mo. 1929 §§4200, 4202, as to judicial paroles; also note
Kella v. Bradley (1935) 229 Mo. App. 821, 84 S. W. (2d) 653.
143. Ex parte Strauss (Mo. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 1000.
144. Ex parte Webbe (Mo. 1929) 30 S. W. (2d) 612.
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sentence.145 Accordingly, when the governor had commuted a
ten year sentence to a term in the Missouri Reformatory, condi-
tioned that the prisoner comply with all the rules and regulations
of said reformatory, or be returned by the superintendent there-
of to the penitentiary to serve the rest of the sentence, it was
held that whenever the prisoner failed to comply with all the
rules and regulations of the reformatory, it was the express
duty of the superintendent to return him to the penitentiary. If
the superintendent failed to do so, it was held to be a part of
the executive function of the governor to sustain and make effec-
tive the terms of his order of commutation. 148 It would therefore
appear that the power of revocation may be delegated by the
governor by the terms of the conditional commutation, although
this case left no room for the governor's delegate to exercise any
discretion whether or not it was proper to make the revocation,
if he found the conditions broken. So it appears that the gover-
nor is not confined to the statutory ground or manner of revoca-
tion, in view of the constitutional provision, which indicates that
he has such power independently of statute,147 and he may, as a
result, fix his own manner and method of revocation.1
The court or the judge in vacation is given the discretionary
power by statute to terminate paroles which the court or judge
may have granted.14 9
Notice and Hearing
Where the parole or conditional pardon or commutation re-
serves in the governor the right to summarily determine if the
conditions have been broken by the beneficiary, the proceedings
of revocation are purely informal.150 Where, however, the parole,
pardon, or commutation makes no provision for revocation and
none exists by virtue of the constitution or statute, the rule of
the common law seems to be applicable. Under the common law,
the established practice is for some court of general criminal
jurisdiction, upon having its attention called by affidavit or other-
wise, to the fact that a pardoned convict has violated or failed to
145. Ibid.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid.; Lime v. Blagg (1939) 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583.
148. Lime v. Blagg (1939) 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583.
149. See R. S. Mo. 1939 §§4201, 4202. After one revocation, the Court
may grant a second parole. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4200.
150. Ex parte Strauss (Mo. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 1000.
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comply with, the condition or conditions of his pardon, to issue
a rule reciting the original judgment of conviction and sentence,
the pardon and its conditions, and the alleged violation of, or
non-compliance with, the condition or conditions thereof, and
requiring the sheriff to arrest the convict and bring him before
the court to show cause why the original sentence imposed upon
him should not be executed. A copy of such rule should be served
upon the convict at the time of his arrest, and when brought
before the court, if the prisoner denies that he is the same person
who was convicted, sentenced and pardoned, he has an absolute
right to a trial by jury. Otherwise a person might be remanded
to suffer punishment who has never had a jury trial. If his
identity is not denied, all the other facts and issues can be heard
and tried by the judge alone.151,
The right of the parolee to a hearing before revocation also
applies where the parole is granted by the court. In one interest-
ing case,152 the defendant was paroled and a short time after-
wards was arrested without warrant or other process and in-
carcerated in jail without a hearing. He sought his freedom by
making application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that
Section 2181, Revised Statutes 1899,51 which authorized the
court or judge in vacation to terminate said parole at any time,
without notice to such a person by merely directing the clerk
of the court to make out and deliver to the sheriff or other proper
person a certified copy of the sentence, with a certificate that
such person has been paroled and his parole terminated, was un-
constitutional. He further alleged that the parole statute was
wise and salutary in so far as it granted him immunity for his
offense, but he insisted that the same statute was invalid when
the court asserted the right to revoke without giving him a trial
as to its right and power so to do. The court rejected his con-
tention on the ground that he had accepted the parole, which he
had applied for voluntarily, and which was issued under and
subject to the provisions of the contested statute, and thereby
upheld the constitutionality of such statute. The court also dis-
151. Ex parte Strauss (Mo. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 1000, 1001. See State v.
Collins (1910) 225 Mo. 633, 125 S. W. 465, for suggestion that where a
question of personal identity arises after revocation of a bench parole, the
remedy can be by habeas corpus.
152. State v. Collins (1910) 225 Mo. 633, 125 S. W. 465.
153. Now R. S. Mo. 1939 §4202.
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posed of the further argument of the defendant that the officer
under this statute might arrest the wrong man and thus deprive
an innocent citizen of the right to show that he was not the
person described in the warrant. The court indicated that the
innocent party, in such a case, could invoke the writ of habeas
corpus, but that here the petition established the identity of the
prisoner, and consequently no issue of identity could be injected
into the case.
Where a convict is on parole and is convicted of a new offense,
the new conviction and sentence constitute a judicial determina-
tion of a violation of one of the conditions of his parole. 54 Since
the power to parole is vested alone in the trial court, the action
of the court or judge thereof in terminating, as well as in grant-
ing the parole, is not subject to review by an appellate court.' 55
However, a motion by the prosecuting attorney to revoke a parole
on the ground that the judgment granting it was procured by
fraud practiced upon the court, is an independent action in
equity, to which the parole statutes are not applicable."5 Hence,
the prisoner could disqualify a regular judge from hearing the
motion, although the case expressly holds that this ruling does
not interfere with the statutory jurisdiction of the circuit judge
to grant and to revoke paroles under the statute.
The Missouri statutes set forth the manner in which judicial
paroles may be terminated. For instance, where the parole has
been awarded to a defendant upon whom a jail sentence has been
imposed by the court or who is actually confined in jail under a
judgment of a justice of the peace, or who is sentenced to one
of the juvenile reformatories, the court, or judge may at any
time, without notice to the defendant, terminate his parole by
simply directing execution to issue on the judgment, or, in case
the person shall have been actually confined in jail, the parole
may be terminated by directing the sheriff or jailer to retake
such person under the commitment already in his hands.157 In
154. Ex parte Green (1929) 322 Mo. 857, 17 S. W. (2d) 939, citing Ex
parte Strauss (Mo. 1928) 17 S. W. (2d) 1000.
155. State ex rel. Gentry v. Montgomery (1927) 317 Mo. 811, 297 S. W.
80.
156. State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Kelly (1940) 346 Mo. 416, 142 S. W.
(2d) 27, over-ruling Ex parte Smith (1938) 232 Mo. App. 521, 119 S. W.(2d) 65.
157. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4200. The Circuit Court of the county where de-
fendant was convicted, sentenced and paroled, clearly has jurisdiction to
revoke defendant's parole and order the sheriff to take him into custody.
Kella v. Bradley (1935) 229 Mo. App. 821, 84 S. W. (2d) 653.
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other cases, the court or judge granting the parole, may termi-
nate it at any time without notice by merely directing the clerk
of the court to make out and deliver to the sheriff or other proper
officer a certified copy of the sentence, together with a certificate
that such person has been paroled and his parole has been termi-
'nated. It is then the duty of such officer as soon as he receives
such copy of the sentence, to arrest the defendant and deliver
him to the warden of the penitentiary as if no parole had been
granted.1 58
Time for Revocation
The purpose of the judicial parole is said to be the reforma-
tion of men and women of previous good character, who have
been convicted of a crime for the first time and whose prospec-
tive punishment is imprisonment in the penitentiary. 9 If refor-
mation can be accomplished without placing upon the defendant
the stigma of having been a convict, society is fully protected and
its best interest actually served. But such reformation, if it can
be accomplished at all, will take longer in some cases than in
others. Partly perhaps in recognition of this fact, the legislature
by statutory enactment has placed a minimum and a maximum
limit upon the period of the judicial parole. 100 The statute has
been construed to mean that, if a ten year period has elapsed
and the parole has not been terminated nor the parolee dis-
charged from his sentence, the court must either grant him an
absolute discharge or terminate his parole at the first term of
court thereafter, or the law will conclusively presume thereafter
that such person has been discharged. In other words, this law
is, in effect, a statute of limitations upon the parole period and
vests in the parolee the right to have his parole terminated after
the lapse of a reasonable time. 61
A closely related problem arises where the court orders an
indefinite suspension of sentence. Such a problem arose where
the court ordered the defendant released from jail and granted
him a suspension of punishment that he might seek a change in
climate, and the defendant, later when an effort was made to
impose the suspended punishment, contended that the court had
158. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4202.
159. State ex rel., Howell County v. West Plains Tel. Co. (1911) 232
Mo. 579, 135 S. W. 20.
160. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4207.
161. Ex parte Mounce (1925) 307 Mo. 40, 269 S. W. 385.
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no power to order a suspension in the first place and that the
lapse of time entitled him to a release. The court recognized the
fact that, in the absence of some statutory provision, the judg-
ment of a court imposing a jail sentence can only be satisfied
by a compliance with its terms; that the unauthorized release
did not in any way operate to the prisoner's advantage or dis-
advantage at the time; that the defendant was not technically
in jail while he was, in fact, at liberty; and that the lapse of the
time, after the sentence for which he was adjudged to be con-
fined in jail, did not automatically release him from liability to
be retaken and required to serve the remainder of his term..
62
However, the court went on to say that although a mere delay
in the infliction of punishment is not a sufficient reason for re-
lieving a defendant from the consequences of the judgment
against him, if the delay has been so great that society could
derive no good from its enforcement, there would seem to be no
good reason why its execution should be insisted upon. 163
This same reasoning might be applied to the failure of the
revoking authority to terminate a parole for a violation of its
conditions by the beneficiary, until a long period of time has
elapsed, or to an escaped convict, who, after his escape, has lived
years as a law abiding person, no efforts having been made to
return him to prison until years later.
Effect of New Sentence-Concurrent or Consecutive Execution
By virtue of statute, a convict, whose parole has been revoked
for a new conviction while on parole, must first complete his
former sentence and after its completion serve the latter.165 The
warden has no authority in the matter, and he and the other
officials cannot determine legally the order in which the sentences
should be served.166 As a result, where the prison board caused
its records to show that the prisoner was serving the new sen-
162. Ex parte Bugg (1912) 163 Mo. App. 44, 145 S. W. 831.
168. Ibid. (Here three years had elapsed on a six months jail sentence.
The court held, however, that the fine assessed could be collected, since
collection had not yet been barred by the statute of limitations.) Also,
,ee State v. Snyder (1889) 98 Mo. 555, 12 S. W. 369.
164. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9226.
165. Ex parte Allen (1906) 196 Mo. 226, 95 S. W. 415; Lee v. Gilvau
(1921) 287 Mo. 231, 229 S. W. 1045; Ex parte Green (1929) 322 Mo. 857,
17 S. W. (2d) 939; Ex parte England (Mo. 1938) 122 S. W. (2d) 89Q;
Herring v. Scott (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 670.
166. Ex parte Green (1929) 322 Mo. 857, 17 S. W. (2d) 939; Herring v.
Scott (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 670.
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tence first, and, after the time when he was entitled to his dis-
charge from this sentence had expired, retained him to serve out
the rest of his first term, dating from his parole therefrom, the
court held that the convict had not been prejudiced by the wrong
views of the board of prison control and could take no advantage
of its erroneous system of bookkeeping.167
Yet there do seem to be some situations where the convict can
benefit by the error of the prison authorities in this respect. For
instance, in one case the convict received a fifteen year sentence
in 1925 and was paroled in 1930. While on parole he was again
convicted and sentenced to a term of ten years from 1933, but his
parole was not revoked until 1934. He served the second sen-
tence until he was paroled from it in 1939. The court held that
he was, with his time properly credited, entitled to his discharge
subject to the terms of his second parole." 8 But the court stated,
in this connection, that if the second parole should be legally re-
voked, he would not be entitled to the time which he had had
credited mistakenly on his second sentence and which was by
this proceeding transferred to his first sentence in satisfaction
thereof. In other words, the court did not rule that such time
could be counted on both sentences.
The words in the statute governing the sequence of sentences
that the new sentence "shall not commence to run until the ex-
piration of the sentence under which he may be held" has been
construed to mean that the two sentences should be cumulative
and not concurrent.16 However, a later interpretation indicates
that if it means that the order in which the sentences are served
is immaterial, such a construction ignores the plain words of the
statute.170 While one motive of the legislators in passing the
statute may have been to prevent such sentences from running
concurrently, they must have meant more than that. They were
not dealing with offenses having some relation to each other,
such as those of a kindred nature or committed or tried about
the same time, where the idea of concurrent execution would
more naturally occur, but, on the contrary, they were contem-
plating a situation where a convict under sentence for one felony
167. Lee v. Gilvan (1921) 287 Mo. 231, 229 S. W. 1045; Ex parte Green(1929) 322 Mo. 857, 17 S. W. (2d) 839.
168. Herring v. Scott (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 670.
169. Lee v. Gilvan (1921) 287 Mo. 231, 229 S. W. 1045.
170. Herring v. Scott (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 670.
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commits another perhaps of a different kind and at a remotely
later time, which consideration apparently justified the imposi-
tion of the requirement that in event of a conviction of the latter,
the sentence therefor should not commence to run until the con-
vict had fully paid his debt to the state for the first conviction.
In this connection, the fact that the convict was out on parole
when the second offense was committed did not make him any
less "under sentence" for the first offense and subject to the
statutory order of execution. 1,
Subsequent Conviction and the Three-fourths Law
One reason that the sequence of serving sentences in cases of
the kind above discussed is important is the statute commonly
referred to as the three-fourths law, 17 2 by virtue of which a
prisoner, if his conduct is proper, after serving three-fourths of
his sentence, must be discharged from the penitentiary. This law
and the statute fixing the proper sequence have required the re-
lease of the prisoner in several cases where, after the revocation
of a parole or commutation, the second sentence has been served
first, with no violation of the prison rules being recorded. 73 So,
where the prisoner, while under a conditional release, was sen-
tenced to and served sixty days in jail on a new charge, and,
was returned to the prison by virtue of a revocation of his con-
ditional commutation, and served three-fourths of his original
sentence, with no violation of the rules of the prison charged
against him, he was entitled to his releaseY74 The same result
occurred where the defendant, on October 12, 1931, entered a
plea of guilty to stealing chickens and was sentenced to the peni-
tentiary for six years. On October 22, 1934, after serving over
three years, he was granted a conditional commutation, and on
June 18, 1935, while the period of probation prescribed by the
commutation was still operative, he pleaded guilty to a charge
of grand larceny and received a two year sentence. For some
reason, contrary to statute, he served his second sentence first
and was then held to serve the remainder of his first sentence,
171. Herring v. Scott (Mo. 1940) 142 S. W. (2d) 670.
172. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9086. For discussion of the seven-twelfths rule,
see note 24, supra.
173. Ex parte Carney (1938) 343 Mo. 556, 122 S. W. (2d) 888; Ex parte
England (Mo. 1938) 122 S. W. (2d) 890. Also note Ex parte Rody (Mo.
1941) 152 S. W. (2d) 657.
174. Ex parte England (Mo. 1938) 122 S. W. (2d) 890.
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which had been conditionally commuted, so that when his peti-
tion for the writ of habeas corpus was filed he had actually
served three-fourths of the first sentence in prison."
But the three-fourths statute has no application whatsoever to
a convict on parole in the sense, that if his conduct is good, he
cannot be held under parole for a period, counting the time that
he was incarcerated, together with the time served on parole, in
excess of the three-fourths of his sentence. This is so because
the three-fourths statute is construed as purely a prison rule and
consequently applicable only to a convict while confined in the
penitentiary.17 6 But what is the effect of the three-fourths law
175. ".... we think it consonant with the legislative intent to say that
the statute is not susceptible to the construction that a parolee, because
of his subsequent. conviction while at large under parole is to be denied
the benefits of the three-fourths rule, and required to serve the full term
for which he was sentenced. The evident purpose of enacting the statute
was to stimulate and encourage a willingness on the part of convicts to
voluntarily comply with the rules of the institution while undergoing pun-
ishment. Their own conduct, as reflected by the official records of the
prison, is the measure by which there is either bestowed or withheld a
fixed and predetermined reward for cooperation in promoting the orderly
administration of prison discipline. Infractions of law while on parole
carry their own punishment, as witness the second conviction of petitioner,
and the resultant revocation of his parole. The provisions of the statute
under scrutiny and the conditions of the parole under which petitioner was
at large when convicted (second time) are in no sense related or inter-
dependent." Ex parte Carney (1938) 343 Mo. 556, 122 S. W. (2d) 888.
176. "Granting the Carney case was well ruled on the facts, there are
vital differences between it and the instant case. There the convict was
out on parole when he committed the second offense. His parole was a
conditional pardon and he was not 'confined in the penitentiary', as was
the prisoner here. Further, the second crime there was merely grand
larceny in a remote county, whereas here the petitioner escaped from
prison while constructively confined therein but actually outside the walls
under guard. Crimes committed by a paroled convict may be said to have
no relation to the administration of the penitentiary, as the Carney case
rules, except that incidently they may bring the culprit back for expiration
thereof, and also that they exhibit a criminal tendency. But where a
statute is enacted for the regulation of the penitentiary and the enforce-
ment of discipline therein, as was Section 4307, supra, we are unable to
see why it should not be as binding on the convict as if the same require-
ment had been made by a regulation of less dignity, namely a mere rule
of the institution. Undoubtedly, Section 4307, is a law governing the in-
mates of the penitentiary, within the meaning of Section 9086." Ex parte
Rody (Mo. 1941) 152 S. W. (2d) 657, 659. Also, see Ex parte Carney
(1938) 343 Mo. 556, 122 S. W. (2d) 888. This case also holds that the
guilt of a convict for violation of a prison law, so as to bar his discharge
after serving three-fourths of his sentence, is for the prison authorities and
not the courts to decide, and a convict is constructively "confined in the
penitentiary" whether he be going to the penitentiary or outside under
guard. The escape of a trusty from the place of his employment, however,
outside the walls is not an escape from the penitentiary, within the scope
of the statute making it a felony for any person confined in the penitentiary
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upon a convict serving a life sentence? The answer seems to be
none whatever.177
It may be, however, that even in the face of the statute fixing
the sequence of sentences for a conviction after a broken parole,
the court can by its own judgment decree whether the new sen-
tence shall run concurrently or consecutively with the old." ' Per-
haps, in this respect the statute might be regarded as a legisla-
tive attempt to interfere with the constitutional power of the
court.
Extradition of Parole Violators
By permitting the parolee to go into another state, the paroling
state may lose jurisdiction over the convict's person, but it does
not lose jurisdiction over the parole, and is not estopped to
extradite the parolee in the event of a revocation.179 Similarly,
if a person convicted of a crime is paroled and violates the terms
of his parole by escaping into another state, he may be extra-
for a term less than life to escape therefrom, since another statute ex-
pressly covers the escape here involved. State v. Betterton (1927) 317
Mo. 807, 295 S. W. 545.
177. "It may be conceded that he became entitled to whatever benefit an
observance of those conditions gave him, but what benefit was that? Simply
this: that he became entitled to be recommended to the governor as a fit
subject for pardon. This benefit he has received. His right to a pardon
does not lie in the terms of the statute.... The expiration of such a period
cannot be affirmed of one sentenced for life. Equitably, the prisoner is
perhaps entitled to his discharge, but that is a subject which lies entirely
in the discretion of the executive." Ex parte Collins (1887) 94 Mo. 22,
6 S. W. 345.
178. See Ex parte Simpson (Mo. 1927) 300 S. W. 491, where the prisoner
was convicted of grand larceny, sentenced to two years, and while on bail
pending appeal, which terminated in a reversal, was convicted and sen-
tenced to two years for burglary, said new sentence to commence on ex-
piration of the term of imprisonment for the grand larceny offense, and
the prisoner was in the penitentiary when the mandate of the supreme
court reached the warden, the imprisonment became referable to the judg-
ment in the grand larceny case as of the date the mandate was handed
down. His three-fourths time having consequently expired, any further
detention was unlawful.
179. "On petitioners release from the California penitentiary, his sen-
tence to said penitentiary was suspended during the time he was under
parole. Even so, he was not at liberty, for he was under the restraint of
the conditions of the parole. This is true, even though California lost juris-
diction of his person. On revoking said parole, California did not under-
take to exercise jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. On the con-
trary, it sought jurisdiction of his person by requisition on the governor of
Missouri. Petitioner escaped the restraint of the parole by violating a
condition of the same. In doing so, he thereby acquired the status of an
escaped convict. As such he is subject to extradition under the federal
constitution and law." Ex parte Kabrich (1938) 343 Mo. 196, 120 S. W.
(2d) 42.
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dited, s0 for a person may be considered a fugitive from justice
whenever he departs leaving the demands of the state from which
he fled, unsatisfied. Under the federal constitution and statutes,
it is the governor's duty to surrender a fugitive upon the proper
demand of the governor of another state. However, the fugitive
may be required to complete a sentence in the asylum state before
he is turned over to the state from which he fled, although the
governor may waive the right to require the fugitive to serve
such sentence before releasing him to the demanding state.1 8'
Such a waiver may be in the form of a pardon. If so, it becomes
absolute upon the surrender of the fugitive to the authorities of
the other state.U2
The courts of the asylum state are without jurisdiction, upon
an application for a writ of habeas corpus, to determine whether
the parolee, whose extradition is being sought, has actually vio-
lated his parole. At least, this was the conclusion of the court
in a case where an inmate of the Illinois penitentiary was given
permission to reside temporarily and conditionally in Missouri.
Upon information that the inmate was under arrest for a vio-
lation of a law of Missouri, the warden ordered him retaken and
returned to the penitentiary pending a determination by the Illi-
nois authorities whether he had violated his parole. The governor
of Illinois immediately made a requisition for the inmate's return
to that state, which request was promptly honored by the gover-
nor of Missouri. The inmate was successful in the circuit court
of St. Louis in his efforts to obtain his release, but the supreme
court rejected his contention that the question of his innocence
180. Ex parte Weinhause (1919) 202 Mo. App. 245, 216 S. W. 548;
Mattes v. Taylor (Mo. 1941) 153 S. W. (2d) 833.
181. "We hold that when a convict is granted a parole by the governor,
he may honor the requisition to deliver the paroled convict to the authori-
ties of the demanding state. The State has the right to waive punishment
of a convict. It is not a matter for the convict to decide which state shall
punish him when he has violated the criminal law of two states. In such
circumstances, it is the right of the asylum state to decide whether it will
punish the prisoner or waive the punishment by turning him over to the
demanding state; the prisoner has no voice and will not be heard." Mattes
v. Taylor (Mo. 1941) 153 S. W. (2d) 833, 834.
182. State v. Saunders (1921) 288 Mo. 640, 232 S. W. 973. In this case,
however, note the separate opinion that the document executed by the
governor of Iowa did not waive that state's right, as it was neither a pardon
nor a parole; that it was called a suspension of the judgment of the court
was of no consequence, for as such it involved a matter not within the
scope of executive power.
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or guilt as a parole violator could be determined in a proceeding
for extradition.1 3
IV. SOME PROSPECTIVE PROBLEMS
There are several natural inquiries which will arise and which
have not been answered directly in the foregoing discussion of
Missouri law, should Missouri eventually follow the present-day
trend and vest the power of parole in the parole board. For
instance, by what process should the power be vested in such a
board? Does the pardoning power so rest in the governor by
virtue of the constitution that the power to parole cannot be
vested by the legislature in any other agency? Is the power to
parole an exclusive executive function? If the power is granted
to a board by legislative enactment, is the grant unconstitutional?
Would such a statute vest judicial power in the parole board?
Would an act of this type, if it contained the customary provi-
sion that the board shall establish rules and regulations regard-
ing the granting of paroles, constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power?
Of course, none of these inquiries has been answered by the
courts of this state due to the fact that the Missouri board is
merely an advisory board. Any answer must be secured by
recourse to the constitution, to the language of existing decisions
by our courts on related subjects, and to the decisions of the
courts of other states.
Since the courts of Missouri hold that the power of parole can
be exercised only by the governor on the ground that a parole
is simply a conditional pardon, "4 the conclusion would seem to
follow logically that the power could not be vested by statute in
a parole board. It might, however, be suggested that the courts
of Missouri have been mistaken in the real nature of a parole.
It has been held elsewhere that a parole is not a pardon nor a
commutation."'5 If it is neither of these, then, one might well
conclude that the power of parole is not an exclusive function
of the governor, especially in view of the fact that the power
of parole is not vested by the constitution in the executive by the
use of the word "parole."
183. State ex rel. Cooney v. Hoffmeister (1935) 336 Mo. 682, 80 S. W.(2d) 195.
184. See note 20, supra.
185. See State v. Peters (1885) 43 Ohio 629, 4 N. E. 81.
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It is well settled generally that the statutes vesting the power
of parole in a board do not infringe upon the judicial power of
the courts.8 8 While the exercise of this power requires the use
of judgment and discretion, the power is not basically judicial
but administrative. 187 On the other hand, whether the authoriza-
tion of the board to adopt rules and regulations, relative to the
eligibility of prisoners for parole, constitutes an unlawful dele-
gation of legislative power, is a question not settled by the cases
so far decided. In order to determine whether the delegation is
unlawful, it is, of course, necessary to examine the language of
the statute and apply the principles of law applicable to the dele-
gation of authority to other administrative boards.
Should any effort be made in Missouri to vest the power of
parole in the parole board, the only safe procedure is by the
amendment of the state constitution. This would eliminate the
constitutional objections.
186. People v. Dennis (1910) 246 IlI. 559; 92 N. E. 964; State v.
Stephenson (1904) 69 Kan. 405; 76 Pac. 905; Wilson v. Common (1910)
141 Ky. 341; 132 S. W. 557.
187. Woods v. Tennessee (1914) 130 Tenn. 100; 169 S. W. 558.
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